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 Abstract 
The use of Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) in supply chains has received a lot of 
attention from academia and practitioners in the recent past. Due to important gains in 
efficiency and visibility in the supply chain, a widespread adaptation is expected to make 
RFID tags ubiquitous in the future. Thus far, the main criticism of RFID revolves around 
privacy problems. 
In this paper we show that other security issues besides consumer privacy may arise, 
particularly in a supply chain. Analysed situations include open and closed loop RFID 
setups and the impact of different attacks on these setups. Building on this, we propose a 
RFID attack risk classification. Furthermore, we discuss the practical implications of these 
risks on supply chain operations. 
1 Introduction 
Radio Frequency IDentificaton (RFID) is a technology which allows contactless access to 
data on a transponder (also called tag or chip). Already in the late forties of the last 
century RFID was used to identify friendly aircraft. In 1948, Stockman [1] described the 
base of RFID in his seminal article “Communication by Means of Reflected Power”. 
Ongoing miniaturization and advancements in technology have lead to smaller and 
cheaper tags, which have made widespread use of RFID possible in supply chains. For a 
historic overview of the development of RFID technology see [2].  
The benefits of RFID in supply chains are well documented. Large retailers, e.g. Wal-Mart 
and the Metro Group as well as large consumer goods producers like Procter & Gamble 
and Unilever, are amongst the early adaptors of the technology. Defence Departments also 
expect significant efficiency gains and cost reduction for their Military Logistics 
Operations. Better stock keeping, reduced shrinkage, improved tracking, better informa-
tion flows along the supply chain and a higher service level are some of the benefits 
attributed to the introduction of RFID [3]. 
RFID is sometimes presented as a more sophisticated barcode or simply as the natural 
evolution from a paper-based to an electronic auto-ID technology. This analogy is danger-
ous, as it could result in inadequate risk management of RFID projects and systems. If not 
addressed, the specific nature of RFID, namely the wireless interface and the small 
computational footprint, might lead to security problems. The risks of RFID implemen-
 tations are often solely seen as a consumer privacy problem, which can be dealt with at the 
point of sale by deactivating the tags. However, RFID specific security risks such as 
information leakage and data inconsistency arise along the entire supply chain. Ignoring 
the RFID specific risks in a supply chain environment can become quite costly. A 
preliminary consideration of the security risks is a prerequisite to achieve a successful 
RFID implementation. Rather surprisingly, the security implications of RFID projects for 
the supply chain are rarely addressed in a structured manner, but, if at all, on an ad hoc 
basis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we give a brief introduction to 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) and RFID, as well as to RFID specific supply chain 
setups. We explore the possible relations between benign and malicious RFID-readers as 
well as genuine and forged tags. Furthermore, we outline a number of possible attacks on 
the settings discussed and their respective impact on the supply chain operations. The 
implementation difficulty and the benefits for the attacker build the base for the RFID risk 
classification. Finally we derive practical recommendations regarding risk management in 
RFID supported supply chains. 
2 Literature review 
SCM is a concept according to which companies in different tiers of a value creating chain 
collaborate in order to be more competitive. The collaboration may include sharing of 
sales and planning information and is typically supported by information systems [4]. In 
this paper, we only consider a very simple, two stage supply chain, consisting of a whole-
saler with a warehouse and a retailer with a single store. The reduction of the supply chain 
to such a simplistic model is adequate, since conclusions about possible attacks and risks 
with this model can be generalized. 
A RFID system consists of one or more readers, and one or more tags. The term reader 
may be confusing since it is sending data as well. A backend information system con-
nected to the readers is needed to link the information on the tags to databases. The Elec-
tronic Product Code (EPC) tags for instance only store a static identifier on the tag, 
information with little value without an information system [5]. 
The RFID system in a supply chain can either be designed as an open or closed loop. In a 
closed loop setup, the tags do not leave the store, warehouse or production site with the 
 product, whereas in an open loop the tag remains attached and is shared between the mem-
bers of the supply chain. So far, due to cost constraints, tags are typically attached to 
transport containers or palettes, not the individual product itself. This will change in the 
near future, when falling tag prices could make item level tagging profitable [6]. 
In an RFID environment, one can distinguish between malicious and benign readers or 
tags. A malicious reader or tag is used by an attacker to attack the system, whereas the 
benign readers and tags are targets of those attacks. This leads to four possible settings of 
tag-reader interaction [Figure (i)]. 
 
Figure (i) Interaction between benign and malicious readers and tags [7]. 
It is important to note that attacks can also occur outside of intended RFID communication 
channels, e.g. by destroying tags or attacking the backend infrastructure. However, there is 
far more experience on securing databases and infrastructure than RFID. The main focus 
of this paper is on RFID specific attacks and we assume backend system security as given. 
Classifications of attacks against an RFID enabled supply chain may be established with 
different criteria. In [8] the following risks to a business operating RFID Systems are 
distinguished: Business Process Risk, Business Intelligence Risk, Privacy Risk, and 
Externality Risk. In [9] possible attacks on a supply chain were analysed and classified 
according to the type of risk. The authors distinguish between the consumer and supplier 
of tagged goods. The consumer of tags endures privacy risks and risks to physical secu-
rity, whereas the supplier has to face risks of shrinkage, data loss and data integrity. For-
gery as well as unauthorized reads and writes affect both. Three layers of RFID privacy, 
the physical layer, the protocol layer and the application layer are described in [10]. Possi-
ble attacks on RFID supply chains could also be classified along those layers. Another 
 possible and related classification distinguishes the attack vector and the target of the 
attack. 
Furthermore, RFID specific risks could be classified by intent (malicious / accidents) as 
well as other classifications used in security literature (for a list of possible attack 
classifications c.f. [11]). RFID privacy attack trees that can be used to analyse weaknesses 
in the defence of a system were designed and analysed in [12]. 
While there is thriving research about possible attacks on RFID systems, there have been 
only few authors addressing these attacks from a supply chain point of view. In this paper, 
we will discuss the risks of different attacks on supply chains. 
3 Attacks and classification  
 
3.1 Analysed attacks 
In this paper we followed a qualitative research approach. Due to the rather small number 
of fully RFID enabled supply chains and even fewer publicly known attacks, quantitative 
data is sparse and may not be generalizable. Therefore we chose an analytic-deductive 
design. Furthermore, we assume an economic behavioural model for attackers.  
The attacks chosen for analysis have either already been proven feasible or are likely 
candidates for successful implementations against supply chain operations. The following 
attacks will be analysed regarding their impact on a supply chain:  
- An Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) seems an unlikely candidate, since it is generally 
associated with nuclear attacks. However, it was demonstrated that it was possible to de-
stroy an RFID tag in vicinity merely with the discharge from a capacitor found in a 
disposable camera [13]. Although the strength of electromagnetic pulses diminishes by the 
square with the distance from the emitter, which greatly reduces the scalability of this at-
tack, it still seems possible to build a RFID zapper to take out a small area, e.g. a smart 
shelf.  
- Channel flooding or jamming results in a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the 
communication between readers and tags. During channel flooding a malicious reader 
 constantly sends out fake replies to communication requests by legitimate readers, which 
makes normal reader tag communication impossible. Jamming attacks are less sophisti-
cated and are characterized by an emitter that sends noise in the relevant frequencies to 
disrupt communication. Channel flooding or jamming is used in some privacy protection 
technologies, as a countermeasure to data access by unauthorized readers (e.g. [14,15]). 
- An Injection Attack is marked by either the replacement of a legitimate tag, the addition 
of a malicious tag into a system or the injection of information into a backend system via a 
RFID vector. It was shown in a proof of concept that a maliciously crafted RFID tag might 
introduce destructive code such as a SQL injection, a virus and a buffer overflow into the 
backend database [16]. Assuming the underlying applications and databases are hardened 
against malformed data, the risk of active code injection should disappear over time. 
However, false information in a well formatted way will remain a problem unless a tag to 
reader authentication is in place. 
- A Clandestine Reader can be used to read out information or to intercept communication 
(eavesdropping) without the knowledge of the legitimate RFID tag owner. How a 
clandestine RFID reader could be built is described in [17]. While the approach focuses on 
the low cost of the reader, a smaller form factor of the reader would raise costs and was 
not considered. However, it is well within possibilities to design small clandestine readers 
for illegitimate reading of tags. Nevertheless, some size constraints apply while designing 
a clandestine reader with regards to antenna size and the necessary power source. 
Unauthorized readouts of RFID tags are also called skimming. At a first glance skimming 
of product codes seems unproblematic. However, skimming of tags could to information 
about stock turnover or similar information.  
A timing analysis is a sophisticated attack where the transaction times of readers are ana-
lysed. If the collision detection protocol is known, the number of products could be in-
ferred by the read time, although this might not be feasible outside of a lab setup. Obvi-
ously, it would be easier to scan the tags directly, but the distance covered by the reader to 
tag communication is far longer than the tag to reader distance. Hence, an eavesdropping 
attack could be covertly carried out with significant distance from the original reader. 
 3.2 Classification of Attacks 
The classification of the chosen attacks along the method proposed by [10] is shown in 
Table (i). Injection can occur physically by adding or replacing tags as well as on the 
protocol layer by injecting information at reader requests, and on the application layer 
where malicious code might get executed. 
Layer Type of Attack 
Application Layer Injection 
Protocol Layer Timing Attacks  
DoS 
Eavesdropping 
Injection 
Physical Layer EMP 
Injection 
Table (i) Classification of attacks regarding the affected layer. 
The layer, where an attack is carried out, is also the highest layer where a countermeasure 
can be implemented. One cannot defend against an EMP, which amounts to the physical 
destruction of the tag, on the application layer [10]. 
The main benefits of the introduction of RFID in a supply chain come from increased 
visibility and real time information [18]. This data may also be very valuable for an 
attacker. An attack is carried out if the cost of the attack is smaller than the value gained. 
The cost of the attack can be divided into the direct cost of the attack (material, 
infrastructure, man hours, etc.) and the cost of detection (loss of reputation, legal 
consequences, etc.) and the detection probability.  
RFID drastically lowers the cost of attacks on the supply chain and the detection probabil-
ity. Hence, some attacks which were costly and not profitable have become economically 
viable.  
 4  Results, analysis and discussions 
 
4.1 Risk maps for RFID enabled supply chains 
In order to create a risk matrix, the likelihood and consequence of an attack needs to be 
known. While the consequence of an attack is more easily deductible, the likelihood can 
only be determined indirectly from other characteristics of an attack. The cost to carry out 
an attack, the detection probability and benefits to the attacker are determinants of the 
likelihood of an attack. Table (ii) summarizes the attacks and their respective likelihood. 
Attack Implementation 
Cost 
Detection 
Probability
Benefit of 
attack
Likelihood 
EMP Low High Low Low 
DoS Low High Low Low 
Injection Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Eavesdropping Medium Low High High 
Table (ii) Attacks and their likelihood to occur. 
While disruption attacks, like EMP or DoS, are cheap and easy to implement, it is impor-
tant to note that they do not have a high benefit except for attackers with high intrinsic 
motivation (hackers, protesters, etc.). However, the threat of those attacks could be used 
for extortion. Such behaviour was observed before and during DoS attacks on websites 
[19]. Skimming or injection attacks on the other hand can be quite profitable, since 
information on stock turnover is very valuable. 
Regarding the consequences of the attacks, a distinction between open and closed loop 
cases is necessary, since the attacks have a different impact depending on the RFID setup 
in the supply chain.  
Table (iii) gives an overview of consequences of a successful attack on an open loop RFID 
setup in a supply chain. The risk type defined in [8] is included in order to clarify the point 
of impact of the attack. 
 Attack Range Risk Type Direct Cost 
Consequence
Overall 
Impact 
EMP Shelf Process Risk High Medium 
DoS 
Shelf to 
Warehouse / 
Store 
Process Risk Medium Medium 
Injection Supply Chain 
Process and 
Intelligence 
Risk 
Medium High 
Eavesdropping Supply Chain 
Intelligence 
Risk 
Low High 
Table (iii) Attack impact with open loop setup. 
Table (iv) provides an overview of consequences of a successful attack on a closed loop 
RFID setup in a supply chain.  
Attack Range Risk Type Direct Cost 
Consequence
Overall 
Impact 
EMP 
Shelf to 
Warehouse 
Process Risk High High 
DoS 
Shelf to 
Warehouse 
Process Risk Medium Medium 
Injection 
Warehouse / 
store 
Process and 
Intelligence 
Risk 
Medium High 
Eavesdropping 
Warehouse / 
Store 
Intelligence 
Risk 
Low Medium 
Table (iv) Attack impact with closed loop setup. 
A closed loop setup is more vulnerable to an EMP attack, since the tags circulate in a rela-
tively confined space. Obviously, an EMP would not only destroy tags but also other un-
shielded electronics in vicinity. However, tags are especially vulnerable, since they are not 
shielded and designed to capture electromagnetic waves.  
 Based on the overall impact and the likelihood of the attacks, it is possible to build a risk 
matrix. To give a level of comparability, the manual destruction of tags is included in the 
risk map. Manual tag destruction is comparable to a destruction of barcodes in likelihood 
and impact. However, the risk level shown is relative to the other attacks discussed and 
cannot be compared to existing SCM risk maps without detailed quantitative analysis. In 
the following figures, a darker shade of grey equals a higher level of risk. A risk map for 
an open loop RFID setup is show in figure (ii). 
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Figure (ii) Risk Matrix for an open loop system. 
 Since a RFID system with shared tags is more complex, more possible attack vectors ex-
ist. Especially during transport, a batch is vulnerable to an injection attack, since physical 
security is typically lower than in warehouses. Figure (iii) illustrates the risks of RFID 
attacks in a closed loop setup.  
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Figure (iii) Risk Matrix for closed loop system. 
The reduced impact of the espionage attack (eavesdropping) is due to the focus of the risk 
map for the entire supply chain. A successful espionage in a closed loop setting can be 
business endangering for an individual company in the supply chain. However, the impact 
on the entire supply chain is generally smaller than in an open loop setup. 
One notices that the impact of disruption attacks is higher with a closed loop setup. This is 
due to the fact that it is possible that the destruction of tags or respectively the disruption 
of the communication may affect the entire closed loop system. 
Tag injection attacks are inherently more difficult since the number of tags in the system is 
known and additional tags should be noticed by the backend system which is the reason 
for a lower likelihood compared to Table (ii). Replacement of tags and injection of data 
into tags might still be possible if the tags contain more than an identifier (e.g., environ-
mental data such as temperature or pressure). 
 4.2  Practical implications 
Prior to the implementation of RFID in a supply chain, a risk analysis of the exposed 
infrastructure and information should be carried out. So far very little data on attacks of 
RFID enabled supply chains exist. This can be explained by the following reasons. Supply 
chains having implemented an RFID system are still in a shakedown phase, where the 
main issues are ensuring the functionality. Due to the limited number of targets, there is 
less opportunity for a successful attack. Furthermore, potential attackers may still be 
learning how to best exploit real life RFID supply chains, as most published attacks so far 
were merely proof of concepts in a lab setup. The fact that successful attacks are often not 
published by the victims is widely discussed in security literature generally (e.g. [20]) and 
might be especially relevant in the RFID setting, since the negative publicity associated 
with an attack on a model implementation of RFID in a supply chain could be perceived as 
failure and weaken the acceptance of the technology.  
The following approaches, documented in risk management literature, apply to RFID as 
well. Prevention, early detection and response, and risk transfer are suitable means to deal 
with risk in a company or supply chain. It may, of course, also be acceptable to bear a risk 
without an appropriate control in place, as long as it is based on an explicit decision [21]. 
Prevention of RFID specific attacks firstly relies on good physical security of facilities. It 
is important to note that in some cases factories need enhanced security measures to keep 
the same level of risk compared to a case without RFID, since some attacks are easier. 
Another prevention option is to strengthen the security properties of RFID tags through 
cryptography. However, one of the main problems of most proposed cryptographic solu-
tions is their high cost in computing time and chip memory [22]. Even though there is 
promising research on the reduction of logic gates needed to implement cryptographic 
algorithms [23], cost pressures will likely prevent their widespread adaptation. Further-
more, the computing time required for complex cryptographic operations effectively pre-
vents real time and near real time applications of RFID. Unfortunately, this is precisely 
where the use of RFID would yield the highest gains in visibility and efficiency.  
Added redundancy, meaning the combination of a RFID based system and another system 
in the automated processes makes it possible to mitigate some of the risks associated with 
RFID in supply chains. Special attention needs to be given at the organizational handover 
 points, which are more vulnerable since they are less controllable. The automation due to 
the use of RFID makes injection attacks easier. With an automated incoming goods 
process the substitution of products with tags by counterfeit or empty boxes with the same 
tags are possible. A continuous monitoring should be able to pick up when the same tag 
appears twice in the system. However, such a system of continuous monitoring is not 
always in place. Furthermore, an increase in automation leads to a decrease in manual 
checks, which are able to detect empty boxes. More than one system should be used at 
goods arrival, e.g. a RFID system for automatic data entry and an automated scale which 
cross checks the goods arrival. 
The ongoing research into Attack Detection Systems or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
for RFID has so far mainly focused on privacy protection. A closer look at supply chain 
settings would be beneficial. The RFID Vindictive Sentinel proposed by Sarma [24], 
which allows only registered readers to communicate with the tags in the protection zone 
of the Sentinel, could be seen as an RFID IDS. However, by flooding the communication 
channel, which is the standard response to non-authorized readers, it amounts to a 
homemade DoS attack. While the tags are thus protected from illegitimate kill commands 
and data leaks, the RFID communication in the zone is disrupted, which could also be of 
heavy consequence in a real time scenario.  
Since the attacks discussed are already covered by existing legislation, there is little need 
for RFID specific legislation in the SCM context. However, the forensics needed to prove 
an attack is difficult and has not yet been described in sufficient detail. So far, audit trails 
end at the back-end system, or, in the best case, at the reader, which holds a record of 
transactions. To enhance the chances of successful forensic analysis and in order to create 
an audit trail, a tamper resistant Radio Frequency (RF) recording device which is separate 
from the rest of the RFID infrastructure should be developed and implemented in all 
critical areas.  
Further research is needed in proof of concept attacks, especially the feasibility of the 
attacks in real world supply chains settings to test the resilience of response systems and, 
in the case of disruption attacks, fall back mechanisms. Furthermore, a quantitative cost 
analysis of RFID risks and their impact on visibility and time critical applications would 
provide insight on the business impact of the risks discussed above.  
 5. Conclusions 
The analysis of the potential attacks shows that their impact depends on the setup of the 
RFID system, with open loops more prone to eavesdropping and closed loops to disrup-
tion attacks. 
Process and intelligence risks for the implementing company as well as for the supply 
chain result from using RFID systems. The management of those risks relies on physical 
security, added redundancy with non-RF systems and early detection by intrusion detec-
tion systems. Forensic proof after a successful attack on RFID systems is a widely 
unrecognized issue in RFID risk management.  
Most RFID projects are currently in a shakedown phase, meaning the implementing 
organization is mainly trying to get the systems to work correctly and efficiently, with 
little or no consideration of security. The lack of security concern amongst RFID project 
sponsors and managers is akin to the lack of security concern in Internet projects in the 
late nineties, where viruses and attacks were mainly discussed in academic circles. As 
George Santayana said "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat 
it." 
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